Subsystems of Society ‘Interpenetrate’ to function
Richard Münch defends Parsons against one of Parsons' students, Niklas Luhmann
Richard Münch wrote:
Explaining the unique quality and the development of modern Western society is a classical theme of sociology. Of the great classic authors in the field, Karl Marx formulated the logically most consistent explanation, but he did so at the expense of theoretical scope and of historical accuracy. Max Weber left the most historically detailed explanation, but at the expense of theoretical coherence. For sociology as a theoretical science in its own right, the most fruitful contribution was provided by Emile Durkheim, but this lacked the historical concreteness which Weber achieved. Any attempt we may make today to reach a satisfactory explanation of modern occidental development is impossible without an appropriate integration of Weber’s historical and sociological explanatory contribution with Durkheim’s theoretical perspective. Talcott Parsons made a major step forward with the integration of Weber and Durkheim. The voluntaristic theory of action is the theoretical centerpiece of his integrative work, and at its own center is the theory of interpenetration. Any present-day explanation of modern Western development which does not make use of a theory of interpenetration represents a theoretical retrogression back behind Parsons. This is confirmed if one reads Weber in the light of Parsons’ theory of interpenetration, which only then lends theoretical coherence to his work whilst preserving its historical concreteness; it is further corroborated by the explanatory deficiencies in theoretical approaches with take account neither of Weber nor Parsons in their formulation, and by attempts at reconstructing Weber’s explanation either without the backing of Parsons, or indeed contrary to Parsons’ approach. The latter deficiency also especially applies to the theory of rationalization which predominates in interpretations of Weber …
… In Niklas Luhmann’s … systems theory, the main path of development for modern society is the functional differentiation of subsystems. In his eyes this process involves the more mature development of system-specific rationalities, such as that of the economy, the polity, the law, science and education. The development of specific media codes such as money/property, power/law and truth/methodology lends increased autonomy to the individual subsystems. For Luhmann, the differentiation of systems is itself in principle the solution to the integration problem, a problem he does not understand in terms of the development of a common order, but in terms of preserving compatibilities between different action orientations, something which their differentiation itself ensures. Interpenetration is treated as a prerequisite for a system’s differentiation in a highly complex environment. Thus the formation of a social system involves the personal systems recognizing the various possible relationships they have to their environments, and to other personal systems and their environments, and then adjusting their action accordingly. The more system references of this type individual systems are able to recognize, the more likely they are to learn how to ‘selectively attune’ their ‘inherent selectivity’. If this is the case Luhmann believes a state is reached where each system retains its inherent selectivity without impairing that of the other systems. The formation of the social system is then a consequence of the inherent selectivities of personal systems being made compatible. Going a stage higher to the level of differentiated social systems, one could make the analogous formulation that society is formed when autonomous social systems are made compatible. Interpenetration has no effect on the individual systems’ inner laws, as Luhmann sees it merely as a mechanism whereby the various sets of inner laws can maneuver past each other, and not as a mechanism which impinges on these inner laws and at least partly changes them.
The theoretical objection to Luhmann’s theory of integration, just mentioned, is that it can only be upheld if one disregards the progress Parsons made in superseding the positivistic theory of order. For his theory of integration is positivistic at its heart. A process whereby actors become aware of their complex relations with others and learn to adapt to their inner laws is not sufficient to give rise to order.
The logical objection to Luhmann’s theory of interpenetration is that it postulates a logical impossibility, namely that contradictory sets of inner laws can develop completely without this causing disruption. The concept of interpenetration can only be tenable if it signifies several systems expanding in scope and overlapping, with their inner laws becoming partially restricted in the areas of overlap. Limitations can only be overcome at the expense of complete autonomy.
The empirical objection to Luhmann’s theory of differentiation is that it is incapable of explaining the conclusive hallmarks of modern society. In the framework of his theory, Luhmann can only conceive of the development of the modern economy or modern political systems as a process of detachment from formerly existing close ties—the economy, for example, would become detached from the household, and politics from religion. The economy goes beyond the boundaries of simple household management because of the expansion of the monetary system, and politics frees itself of the attachment to religious legitimation. Hence Luhmann fails to grasp the special features of the modern economy and modern political systems. The specific characteristics of the modern economy are in fact based not on differentiation but on interpenetration. The significance of the application of rational knowledge and rational technology as a hallmark of the modern economy, right down to the rational organization of individual productive units, can only be explained in terms of interpenetration between science and the economy. Equally, the development of order in the market can only be explained by interpenetration between market exchange and the community, assuming the development of universalized community relations. Finally, the significance of rational, forward-planning business management can only be explained by the interpenetration of economic management under market competition with the political system, which guarantees legal order and external operating conditions by way of rational economic policy, and is itself bound by the law.
The essential characteristic of modern political systems is anything but complete detachment from religious legitimation. If the application of political power were separated out in this way the result would be the domination of the political sphere by Machiavellian power techniques. India has provided a notable example of this kind of autonomy for political affairs. However, the opposite is true for modern political systems: here there is an attachment to a political order, and to the law, which can only be explained by the universalization of community relations and the interpenetration of politics and the community. In the same way rational political planning and implementation of decisions in the modern state can only be explained by the interpenetration of science and politics, and economically rational state budgeting only by the interpenetration of economics and politics.
With this theory of differentiation, Luhmann does not manage to reach an adequate explanation of the essential constituent characteristics of modern society. Moreover in standing by this theory Luhmann misses the explanatory opportunities which would be available to him in Parsons’ theory of interpenetration. His incorporation of the concept of interpenetration into functionalistic systems theory leaves the theory of differentiation untouched and the theory as a whole therefore misses out on the crucial theoretical advances made by Parsons. In the one instance where Luhmann meets with a central concept in Parsons’ interpretation of modern Western development as a process of increasing interpenetration, namely the concept of inclusion, he reshapes it to function as an element in the theory of pure systems differentiation. For inclusion—the opening up for all people in principle of participation in the most varied fields of action—is a substitute for population growth; both, he believes, generate the ‘orders of magnitude’ appropriate to the increased density of interaction necessary for functional differentiation. By interpreting it in this way, Luhmann completely conceals the meaning Parsons attributed to ‘inclusion’. Parsons interprets it as the universalization of community relations, which depends on the interpenetration of specific communities, just as it requires communal action to interpenetrate with other action spheres.
Another inadequacy concerns the merely functionalistic explanation of the development of morals. A movement toward increasingly generalized and reflexively relationizing morals is seen as a functional prerequisite for integration under conditions of increased systems differentiation. What Luhmann describes as the evolutionary development of morals is really no more than the fact that they are increasingly intellectualized—a fact which, however, cannot be explained functionally as a prerequisite for integration when systems differentiation increases; rather, the intellectualizing process must be explained as a product of the interpenetration of community morals with intellectual discourse, and with this perspective one soon realizes that the mere intellectualization of morals is not a sufficient reason for the development of their integrative function. Intellectual rationalization cannot provide the basis for our obligation to particular moral principles even at very abstract levels. On the contrary, the inherent logic of this process lies in relativizing the binding quality of moral laws by exhausting all the interpretational scope they have to offer and ‘relationizing’ them, that is judging them in the light of other basic moral principles which sharpen the awareness that a different set of moral rules would always be possible. Luhmann therefore describes something as a prerequisite for the integration of differentiated subsystems which, in the light of the above, simply results from the inner laws of intellectual discourse, and is the precise opposite of integrative morals. Here too, Luhmann falls prey to the error he makes in the very heart of his theory which fundamentally sets him apart from the insights gained in Parsons’ voluntaristic theory of action. He believes that morality, order and integration can simply be attributed to keeping open contingencies, and maintaining an awareness of them. This represents pure positivism.
The emergence of a moral order in differentiated systems is not solely the result of intellectualization; it cannot come about until there has been an interpenetration between the various subsystems, also restricting the logic inherent in the intellectual rationalization of morals. Their binding quality can only come from them being anchored in the community, and this in turn must be universalized by interpenetration between the various specific communities. Yet the relevance of morals for the various spheres of action, and vice versa, originates in the interpenetration of communal action with intellectual, discursive action, economic action and political action, and this is the basic characteristic of the modern moral order. When communal action and intellectual, discursive action interpenetrate, this does not signify mere intellectualization, but a process of systematization as intellectual rationality joins with the obligation to particular principles. Communal action’s interpenetration with economic action determines the realistic and impartial character of communal action, and economic action’s commitment to norms. Communal action’s interpenetration with political action generates the formal legality in the modern moral order, and binds political action to the law. If the attempt is made to base morals entirely on systems differentiation and the maintenance of contingency, the above essential constituent features of modern morals are obscured from view and hence are not explained.
The Source:
Richard Münch, Understanding Modernity: Toward a New Perspective going Beyond Durkheim and Weber, Routledge 1988, 2011 [pp.197, 201-204]
Evolutions of social order from the earliest humans to the present day and future machine age.