Kelly, Governance & Ranking Late Empire
Centralisation, administration, limits on power, offices, "officials were technically soldiers"
The Source:
Christopher Kelly*, ‘Emperors, Government and Bureaucracy, in The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume XIII, The Late Empire, A.D. 337-425, edited by Averil Cameron and Peter Garnsey*, Cambridge University Press 1998
*Subscribers to Social Science Files since July-August 2022
CHAPTER 5
EMPERORS, GOVERNMENT AND BUREAUCRACY
I. INTRODUCTION
Comparisons with divinities (Christian and pagan), grand processions, long speeches and costly purple robes were as much a part of imperial rule and its enforcement as the capacity to issue decrees or command armies. …
Centralisation enhanced the position of emperors by making them the focus of all government activity; but in a large empire it also threatened to isolate them. Emperors risked being pavilioned in splendour within an inaccessible court. Similarly, the rise of bureaucracy held out certain clear and obvious administrative advantages. Above all, it enhanced the ability of imperial government systematically to enforce its policies and collect its revenues. Yet such a powerful and well-ordered institution also threatened to diminish the importance of emperors and the very centrality of their position.
These conflicts dominate this account of later Roman government. Its chief purpose is to examine the tensions which resulted and the strategies deployed by emperors, courtiers and bureaucrats for the maintenance and improvement of their varying positions. A subtle and complex system emerges. It enables certain features — such as the sale of offices or the purchase of influence — to be seen in their proper perspective. These are not simply evidence of 'corruption' or 'moral decline'. Like other means of securing advantage or ensuring survival, they were part of a shifting set of tactical possibilities which marked out a difficult — and sometimes fatal — relationship between those who competed to rule the Roman empire.
2. THE EMPEROR IN THE LATER ROMAN WORLD
Perceptions of power
The emperor in the later Roman world was undoubtedly a powerful figure. He controlled foreign policy, making peace and war at will: he could raise what taxes he willed and spend the money at his pleasure: he personally appointed to all offices, civil and military: he had the power of life and death over all his subjects. He was moreover the sole fount of law and could make new rules or abrogate old at pleasure.
The possible range and depth of emperors' concerns are quickly revealed in the law code promulgated by Theodosius II in 438. The Theodosian Code, which collated over two thousand five hundred imperial edicts issued since 312, contained legislation on such broad topics as taxation, property rights, contractual duties, judicial procedures and penalties, and the responsibilities, ranks and perquisites of civil and military officials, as well as laws regulating a widely diverse and varied set of specific matters including (for example) the demolition of tombs for building material, the construction of river patrol craft for the Danube, the price of bread in Rome's port town of Ostia and the care of horses no longer fit for chariot-racing.
This extraordinary concentration of authority in the hands of one individual weighed heavily on the political imagination of contemporaries. For many, the extent and grandeur of imperial power could best be described by blurring the boundary between the earthly and the divine. … [Some] fourth-century writers pictured emperors as standing 'in the first ranks of the gods' … The ambiguous position of an emperor, standing somewhere between divinity and humanity, was also accommodated within a rapidly developing Christian political theology … Non-Christian thought developed along similar lines, stressing the closeness and similarity of emperor and God, while underlining the superiority and supremacy of the latter. … Despite … injunctions not to take parallels between heaven and earth too literally, many authors … failed to distinguish clearly between this world and the next. Heaven remained a very Roman place. …
… In the Theodosian Code, the emperor's laws, bureaucratic offices, the palace, the court, the imperial wardrobe and even the imperial stables were described as 'sacred'. Any questioning of the emperor's will amounted to 'sacrilege'. Similar reverence was expected towards imperial images. Emperors' statues — like statuesque emperors — were important symbols of power. In the provinces, they were a focus for loyalty and a constant reminder of an ever-present, superior authority. … Those approaching the emperor's statue were expected to adopt the same attitude and ceremony as if they stood before the emperor himself. Equal respect was due to imperial edicts. … They had a dramatic effect. A normally rowdy audience stood in awed silence, straining to hear the sacred commands …
… such rococo representations of power should be taken seriously. An empire is held together not only by military force and efficient administration; it also requires an effective ideology to proclaim the rightness and authority of its government. Such a system can be as important (and as coercive for both rulers and the ruled) as more tangible expressions of power. From that point of view, the vast ceremoniousness of fourth-century society was a key element in helping … to communicate, the legitimacy and dominance of an emperor and his regime. … The deliberate and carefully exaggerated images of majesty not only elevated an emperor above the ordinary — they justified that distance by associating imperial rule with cosmic archetypes. The coalition of a political with a moral order reinforced the emperor's position … Through elaborate rites … late Roman public life enacted an exemplary model of society. Its focus was the emperor. Others could be located only in relation to a glittering imperial centre — a fixed, imperturbable point around which all else seemingly revolved. In that sense, too, ceremonies and the associated images of power … were in themselves important elements in the formation and strengthening of an autocratic regime. Participation in familiar rituals enforced loyalty; loyalty enjoined participation — if only to chant in praise or gaze in wonder. …
… There were other, less dramatic ways of viewing later Roman emperors. Most importantly, the catalogue of imperial virtues (moderation, clemency, frugality, accessibility, willingness to obey laws) and vices (cruelty, capriciousness, unpredictability, inaccessibility), whose long tradition reached back to semi-philosophical treatises on kingship written in the third and second centuries B.C., continued to provide a grid on which contemporaries in the later empire could map their critiques of individual emperors. …
… for fourth-century emperors some conformity to the ideal of a citizen-king was an important demonstration of their fitness to rule. … [Orators placed] emphasis on the continuing importance of long-standing ways of coming to terms with imperial power …
… In the later empire, a range of perspectives, laudatory and critical, was still available — even to court poets and orators. For the most part, despite a marked and steady rise in the importance of court and public ceremonial, and in closely associated images of majesty, the construction, presentation and perception of imperial power remained disputed territory.
The fourth century … was marked by an unresolved tension between traditional moralising views of imperial power, which stressed the close relationship between citizen and king, and … ceremonial versions which emphasised the distance between subject and ruler.
Centralisation
… The careful disposition of monarch, court and cheering crowd emphasised both the centrality of the emperor and — for those who desired power, wealth and position — the overwhelming importance of proximity to that imperial centre. It is hardly surprising that, in the fourth century, high office-holders, military commanders and influential members of the imperial household were known collectively as proximal.
More broadly, in bringing ruler and people face to face, the rituals of an imperial adventus [the arrival of an emperor-entourage in a city] underscored the determination of emperors to be able both to respond directly to the concerns of their subjects and to locate and suppress any possibly subversive activities.
In practice, that determination was expressed by the [quote] ‘fantastic degree’ of centralisation which characterised later Roman government. To be sure, this was, to some extent, an inevitable result of the rapid growth in the imperial bureaucracy at the beginning of the fourth century. But centralisation also protected an emperor's position. The concentration of power at court, and in the bureaucratic departments located near the imperial palace, helped emperors maintain a personal stake in the empire's expanding administration.
Here, too, proximity mattered. It increased emperors' chances of successfully asserting their will — sometimes violently — against the advice of their officials; it kept open the possibility of a personal, or even whimsical, response to embassies or petitions. Above all, centralisation enforced the attendance of high-ranking officials at court. Their presence not only emphasized their dependence upon imperial good will for appointment and promotion; it also offered an emperor — aided by court intrigue or rivalries — a better chance of policing or punishing the powerful who ruled the empire in his name.
An emperor's influence was most keenly felt in the world of the potestates excelsae — the 'lofty powers' who surrounded the throne and offered advice in the debates and discussions of the consistorium (the imperial high council). In formal terms, emperors emphasised their role in the selection of these senior administrative officials through the requirement that documents authorising their appointment bear the imperial signature and — if possible — be presented by the emperor in person. …
… In practice, emperors maintained the attraction of their persons and their court by ensuring that proximity brought success. The high-flying bureaucrat Anatolius owed a series of posts to his well-timed appearances. … More generally, emperors might favour their compatriots … Meteoric rises were matched by sudden falls. For those connected to a previous regime, or to an official fallen from grace, the consequences could be severe. …
… Precipitous falls demanded high-flown rhetoric. But (less dramatically) high-ranking bureaucrats, even without incurring imperial displeasure, could not have expected to remain in office for long. In practice, senior administrative posts were held briefly and irregularly, and were only rarely renewed.
On average, in the fourth century, praetorian prefects were replaced after three or four years; urban prefects after only one or two. Longer stints were exceptional. From an emperor's point of view — despite costs in efficiency and the accumulation of experience — a highly centralised system with a rapid turnover of personnel emphasised the importance of imperial favour in securing and holding office. Importantly too, it limited the opportunities within the administration for the formation of rival coalitions of interest opposed to imperial policy. As far as they were able, emperors tried to replicate a similar level of personal control throughout the empire. In part, this was again achieved by the creation of an [quote] ‘atmosphere of intimidation and violence’.
… sudden benevolence, like random violence … emphasised the dependence of all on the imperial will and underlined the risks taken by those who attempted to flout it.
… dramatic acts — the threat of a massacre and the granting of clemency — brought the emperor close to his people. … Imperial intervention remained an ever-present possibility. … Not all imperial interventions were terrifying. The threat of imperial retribution was matched by an ever-present chance of reward. Again, the centralisation of imperial authority was a crucial tactic. It ensured that provincials continued to regard direct access to the emperor as the most effective method of solving their problems. The result was a never-ending flow of petitions and requests. …
… Lollianus had been appointed as a public teacher by the town council and expected to receive his stipend at regular intervals. But the sums owing were only infrequently paid and then only — so Lollianus alleged — in sour wine and weevil-infested grain … The petition of an insignificant man like Lollianus was an important token of the possible extent and range of imperial power and of the perceived ability of emperors to affect even small matters in a distant provincial market-town. It reinforced the impression that proximity to the imperial court was what really counted.
Equally, the continual upward stream of petitions and requests provided opportunities for emperors to demonstrate their claim to universal authority and beneficence by cutting through obstacles imposed by those with more limited influence. The high level of centralisation in later Roman government weakened local sites of authority, whose rulings might be cancelled or overturned without warning by those closer to the imperial centre. Of course, in practice, few provincials - especially those without friends in the right places - ever made contact with the imperial court or were able to air their grievances outside their own small communities. Fewer still joined the ranks of the potestates excelsae. But … such possibilities could never be entirely excluded. Possibilities — like threats — matter. Buttressed by the occasional well-advertised success or by the rapid advancement of those known to enjoy imperial favour, they ensured the continued irresistible pull of the court. The centralisation of power held out an open-ended promise of success for anyone able to make contact. In the imagination of contemporaries, the emperor had the power to intervene to their advantage in any situation — if only he were told.
The limits of rule
Later Roman emperors - despite their claims, and the hopes of provincials seeking redress - were not omnipotent. In an empire of fifty to sixty million people, which stretched from Hadrian's Wall in northern Britain to the river Euphrates in eastern Syria, there was a limit to the effective power emperors could possibly exercise. The empire's greatest tyranny was distance. Overland, Constantinople was a month's journey away from Antioch; Alexandria, at the Nile delta, was a further six weeks away. Journeys from cities in the Balkans to Rome took around seven weeks. …
… Administrative difficulties arising from the painful slowness of communications were compounded by the absence of any sophisticated methods of information storage or retrieval. Archives, at best, were haphazardly organised. There was, for example, no official, consolidated collection of imperial edicts until the promulgation of the Theodosian Code in 438. The Code's compilers were instructed by the emperor Theodosius II to sort through [quote] 'that mass of imperial constitutions, which sunk in a thick fog, has, by a bank of obscurity, cut off knowledge of itself from human minds'. Their task was made more difficult by the failure of central administrative departments systematically to record copies of laws they had themselves issued. The Code was patched together from a set of miscellaneous sources, including the archives of provincial governors who had received imperial edicts, and the private collections of academic or practising lawyers.
[FOOTNOTE: a contrasting view argues that the Code was compiled chiefly from copy-books which recorded out-going legislation in the imperial archive].
The free flow of information to central government was further restricted by those who feared that their advice might be interpreted as hostile criticism of the emperor or his policies. … Inefficient communications, unreliable records and the risks involved in criticising imperial policy allowed those sufficiently daring, or sufficiently far distant, to ignore imperial directives or knowingly supply the emperor with false or misleading information. …
… Emperors attempted to secure a systematic flow of reliable information by entrusting special imperial missions to two groups within the palatine bureaucracy — the notarii (principally clerks and shorthand writers serving as an imperial secretariat) and the agentes in rebus (principally imperial messengers and supervisors of the public post under the control of the magister officiorum— the head of the palatine administration).
… notarii, sometimes working alongside agentes, acted as imperial representatives in a wide range of diplomatic, military, ecclesiastical and administrative matters. The creation of a separate corps of officials, who could be employed as reporters, messengers or negotiators, allowed emperors to bypass normal channels of information and command.
At the same time, notarii and agentes were also encouraged to inform on the activities of other administrative departments. Expanding the number of bureaucrats involved in cross-checking the conduct of their colleagues helped to reduce the likelihood of any one department or official being able to plan or conceal actions contrary to the imperial interest.
This broad remit, combining the conduct of sensitive and confidential missions with the surveillance of other departments' activities, made both agentes and notarii — like modern tax-inspectors or internal auditors — easy targets for those already highly critical of the growth of centralised bureaucracy. For Libanius [c. 314–393) a teacher of rhetoric in the Eastern Roman Empire] … agentes were the ubiquitous 'eyes of the emperor', interminable ‘snoopers' who, instead of seeking out genuine misconduct, terrorised innocent provincials. Notarii — 'these Cerberuses, these many-headed monsters' — were vilified in similar textbook displays of traditional rhetorical terms of abuse:
“It was impossible for anyone to live near them; no one who met them could speak to them without being robbed or plundered … they went about the common enemies of anyone who possessed anything worth having, whether horse, slave, fruit tree, field or garden.”
For the most part, the reality was more prosaic. There were perhaps only about 1200 agentes in the administration, the great majority operating openly. Given the size of the empire, the difficulty of communication and the volume of information involved, it is unlikely that these officials could ever have functioned as an all-pervasive, imperial 'secret police'. Even so, as Libanius' lurid criticisms suggest, the very independence of such officials raised continual doubts as to their own trustworthiness.
Emperors — acutely aware of the problem — tried to guard their guards by offering the attraction of rapid promotion within the administration and by carefully restricting their movements and activities in the provinces. …
… The uncertainties and doubts emperors faced in securing reliable reports on provincial affairs or the activities of their officials were increased dramatically in the pressurised atmosphere of a highly centralised court. … Certainly, in a system where success demanded imperial favour, many were prepared to go to extremes in order to attract the emperor's attention. [examples given] …
… [The] images of gullible emperors at the mercy of their wives, courtiers and close associates form a sharp counterpoint to the impression of unruffled majesty conveyed by imperial ceremonial. But one should be wary of too strong a contrast. It is perhaps better to see imperial power, in its operation and representation, as a shifting set of tactical possibilities. The growth of a highly centralised system of rule — in part formed and reinforced by splendid rituals — ensured that the court remained the glittering focal point of the late Roman political system. The concentration of power at court underscored emperors' determination to retain a personal stake in the government of empire. Above all, it kept emperors in close contact with officials whose own position was largely dependent on proximity to the throne. Yet, against these clear advantages, a high degree of centralisation also restricted emperors' ability to gather a wide range of information; it exacerbated the problems of long distances and slow communications; it gave considerable authority to family, friends and officials at court. …
… Emperors … relied on highly privileged officers to perform sensitive or secret missions and to report directly on affairs outside the palace. But, in so doing, they risked being misled … In response, emperors moved, as far as possible, to define and regulate the operation of their 'trusted' agents and to threaten … horrific penalties. Of course, there were limits. Too many safeguards or double-checks could paralyse imperial rule. By turns, those who acted contrary to emperors' interests always chanced detection — and usually death. …
3. BUREAUCRACY
Offices and officials
Later Roman emperors could not rule alone. As fourth-century commentators clearly saw, the effective governance of empire inevitably involved a close reliance on sometimes untrustworthy courtiers, relatives, officials and friends. …
… Delegation was an inescapable corollary of autocracy. But its benefits were obvious. Most importantly, it permitted the growth of a sophisticated state bureaucracy primarily dedicated to the establishment and maintenance of central government power through the collection of taxes and the administration of justice.
Without this elaborate centralised machine fourth-century emperors undoubtedly would have been less effective in exploiting the human and economic resources of empire … to levy sufficient tax revenue, or to fund, supply and man the empire's armies, or to enforce the many detailed regulations collected in the Theodosian Code, or even to have received and processed the information which made the drafting of such directives possible. …
Information on the formal structure and organization of the imperial bureaucracy in the fourth century comes principally from the laws collected in the Theodosian Code and from a document known as the Notitia Dignitatem.
The notitia omnium dignitatum et administrationum tam civilium quam militarium is, as its full title declares, ‘a list of all ranks and administrative positions both civil and military’.
Such a document was held by the primicerius notariorum, a high-ranking palatine official responsible for maintaining a list of all holders of senior posts and for issuing their codicils of appointment [details of the history of this document are then given] …
… It was perhaps to serve as a model for a reorganised western administration. The emperor's death forestalled any reunification …
… At court, the detailed administration of empire and the regulation of imperial business, protocol and paperwork was dominated by six key high-ranking officials.
[FIRST]
The praepositus sacri cubiculi (PSC) ran the household with overall responsibility for the castrenses — the eunuchs who attended on the emperor's person — other palace staff (cooks, pages, attendants) and the imperial wardrobe.
[SECOND]
The palatine administration was under the control of the magister officiorum who supervised the scrinia (secretariats) dealing with a range of matters including petitions, reports, the requests of embassies — which might require translation — and the issuing of probatoriae (letters of appointment) to lower-ranking officials. The magister also had general — though not exclusive — responsibility for the organization and operation of the cursus publicus (the imperial postal system), the scholae palatinae (the palace guard), the fabricae (the imperial arms manufactories) and the agentes in rebus.
[THIRD & FOURTH]
Two senior officials headed the imperial treasury—the comes sacrarum largitionum (CSL) and the comes rei privatae (CRP). The former supervised the collection of indirect taxes, such as customs duties, and direct levies in precious metal used to fund the donatives periodically granted to the army. The CSL was also responsible for the administration of state mints, mines, quarries and textile factories.
The CRP controlled imperial properties, their leasing, rents, sale and revenues. The money so raised was chiefly used in paying out disbursements or pensions granted at the emperor's discretion.
[FIFTH]
The judicial functions of the emperor were in the charge of the quaestor sacripalatii (QSP) responsible for the drafting of imperial legislation and from 429 to 438 for the compilation of the Theodosian Code.
[SIXTH]
Lastly, the corps of notarii — which acted as the imperial secretariat and functioned independently of the magister officiorum — was headed by the primicerius notariorum, who was also in charge of issuing codicils of appointment for high-ranking officials and for drawing up the Notitia Dignitatum.
[FURTHER RANKINGS]
Away from the court and its highly centralised bureaux, the basic unit of government throughout the empire remained the province — 114 are listed in the Notitia, each administered by a governor variously styled according to the seniority of the province.
Governors were responsible for local judicial, financial and administrative affairs; they supervised city governments, oversaw public works, and carried out specific imperial directives. The provinces (with the exception of Africa and Asia, whose governors had direct access to the emperor) were grouped into fourteen dioceses, each under the control of a vicarius who had a general supervisory role and in some cases heard appeals from provincial courts.
[Wiki: Vicarius is a Latin word, meaning substitute or deputy. It is the root of the English word “vicar".]
Dioceses, in turn, were grouped into four prefectures — Gaul (which included Britain and Spain), Italy (which included Africa), Illyricum and the East — each in the charge of a praetorian prefect (PPO).
The eastern praetorian prefecture, the largest and most important in the empire, described an arc extending from the Balkans to modern Libya and was divided into five dioceses — Aegyptus (under the praefectus Augustalis), Oriens (under the comes Orientis), Asiana, Pontica and Thrace.
Praetorian prefects were the most powerful civil officials in later Roman government. They had overall responsibility for the administration of the empire (they received the majority of laws preserved in the Theodosian Code) and in judicial matters, along with the emperor, they were the final judges of appeal. The praetorian prefects also headed important financial departments, overseeing the levying of taxation sufficient to finance imperial public works, the administration, the army (both wages and materiel), and to ensure the supply and transport of grain to the empire's capital cities.
Ranking equally with praetorian prefects — although, in practice, significantly less powerful - were the urban prefects of Rome (PVR) and, from 359, of Constantinople (PVC).
These prefects controlled the administrative, financial and judicial affairs of their respective cities. In particular, they supervised officials in charge of the supply of bread, oil, meat and wine, the maintenance of aqueducts, statues and public buildings, and the organization of games and public entertainment.
Provincial governors, vicarii and prefects each headed a permanent administrative department.
The officium of the eastern praetorian prefect was divided into two branches — the administrative and judicial, and the financial. The former was headed by the princeps officii (with overall supervision of the branch's activities as well as of the department as a whole) and his deputy the corniculariur, beneath these officials, in descending order, were the primiscrinius or adiutor (responsible for the enforcement of judgements and court orders), the commentariensis (mainly concerned with criminal trials), the ab actis (dealing with civil cases and judicial records), the curae epistolarum (in charge of the paperwork associated with official reports and of correspondence with vicarii and provincial governors) and the regendarius (responsible for issuing warrants for the use of the imperial postal system).
Each of these officials - excepting the princeps — had three assistants (adiutores) who, in turn, were assisted by chartularii. These were drawn from the exceptores — a corps of junior officials, divided into fifteen groups (scholae), which formed the basic administrative staff of the prefecture.
For the fourth century, the best evidence for the detailed organization of these lower grades in the officium of a high-ranking palatine official comes from a schedule attached to a law issued to the comes sacrarum largitionum by the emperor Theodosius I in 384.
The 446 officials listed are grouped in eighteen divisions and graded in seven classes according to seniority.
Eleven scrinia dealt with a range of administrative tasks: the receipt of gold bullion, the minting of gold, silver and bronze coinage, military uniforms, taxation and accounts.
A similar pattern of meticulous classification seems to have been observed at all levels of the later Roman administration.
On the basic model of the praetorian prefectures, the officium of a provincial governor was also divided into a judicial and administrative, and a financial side. The former was headed by a princeps officii and, in descending order, a cornicularius, commentariensis, adiutor, ab actis and a libellis (probably responsible for receiving petitions), all drawing their clerical assistance from a corps of exceptores.
The impression of detailed order and elaborate hierarchy conveyed by official documents such as the Notitia Dignitatum was underscored by the continued use of military terminology within the civilian administration.
All officials were technically soldiers: their service was known as militia; they received rations (annonae) and a fodder allowance (capitum). Bureaucrats in the officium of a praetorian prefect were enrolled in the fictive legio I Adiutrix — even in the sixth century, the princeps officii, as part of his insignia, carried a centurion's swagger stick.
Above all, later Roman bureaucrats wore distinctive uniforms. An official was easily recognisable by his heavy, military-style cloak (chlamys), by his belt of office (cingulum)with its finely wrought and often highly decorated clasp, and by the brightly coloured patches (segmenta) sewn or embroidered on his tunic.
A mid- to late-fourth-century tomb painting from Durostorum (modern Silistra in Bulgaria) shows a provincial bureaucrat with attendant slaves carrying shoes, a tunic, a parti-coloured cloak and an impressively decorated cingulum. Senior officials were even more splendidly uniformed. The eastern praetorian prefect wore a flame-coloured knee-length cloak striped with gold, a deep-purple tunic and an elaborately embellished crimson cingulum. The urban prefect of Rome dressed in a toga decorated with broad purple bands; he wore red shoes with black straps crossed four times between ankle and knee, each intersection decorated with a small crescent in ivory. Similarly dressed high-ranking palatine officials were depicted on the frescoed walls of an imperial audience hall built in the late third century within the fabric of the pharaonic temple of Ammon at Luxor in Egypt. All wore fine white tunics with exquisitely embroidered segmenta; some too had heavily jewelled belts. These officials formed part of a procession of soldiers and civilians which covered three walls of the hall; the fourth was dominated by a raised platform with a baldacchino (ciborium) over the emperor's throne itself. In an imperial audience hall, in a province far distant from Constantinople, to all who saw them, these striking images of splendidly dressed dignitaries grouped around an imperial throne must have served as a permanent and forcible reminder of the power and magnificence of later Roman officialdom — the glittering uniforms an outward show of its meticulously graded hierarchies. In similar awe-inspiring splendour, in the sacred palace at the centre of the empire's capital, the serried ranks of sumptuously attired bureaucrats stood motionless in the emperor's presence, each carefully positioned - like exquisitely painted figurines - according to the strict order of precedence laid down in the Notitia Dignitatum.
Emperors and bureaucrats
Formal descriptions are important. They rightly emphasise the complexity and sophistication of later Roman bureaucracy and the extent of its concerns.
But one should not be too beguiled by an impression of unchanging order or of the clear-cut categorisation of administrative duties. In its operation, and particularly in the allocation and re-allocation of responsibilities, later Roman bureaucracy reflected both the varying fortunes of high-ranking officials and their influence at court, and, more broadly, the insistent need of emperors to demonstrate their independence by asserting their own authority against the strictures of standard administrative procedure. In 395, the emperor Arcadius stripped the eastern praetorian prefecture of some of the jurisdiction over the cursus publicus (the public post), the scholae palatinae (the palace guard) and the fabricae (the imperial arms manufactories) which it had acquired under the influential prefect Rufinus, transferring these responsibilities to the magister officiorum.
The possibility of shifts in administrative competence was naturally attractive to aggrandising officials (and, if carried too far, was potentially dangerous for emperors) but, in the main, the assignment of variable, indistinct or overlapping responsibilities helped ensure that no one department could become too independently powerful.
Strategically sensitive areas were arbitrarily split. Supervision of both the cursus publicus and the fabricae was shared — with see-sawing shifts in specific responsibilities — between the praetorian prefects and the magister officiorum. The organising principles of irregularity, disruption and division were widely applied. Many comparatively minor functions were frequently distributed in a miscellaneous or patchwork fashion. The issuing of probatoriae (letters of appointment) to lower-ranking officials was divided in a quite arbitrary way between the scrinia under the supervision of the magister officiorum.
Alongside other varied duties, the scrinium memoriae dealt with the appointment of agentes in rebus, palatine officials of the financial departments and junior military commands; the scrinium epistolarum with the staff of praetorian and urban prefects, proconsuls and vicarir, and the scrinium libelorum with officials attached to senior military commanders.
The overlapping of responsibility for various functions also increased the likelihood that departments — perhaps in the hope of enlarging their own sphere of operation — might monitor more closely the work of rivals.
Cross-checking was an important factor in determining the distribution of administrative tasks and the allocation of personnel. The general principle of using agentes in rebus or notarii for a range of sensitive missions — cutting across the responsibilities of all other departments — was given particular force with the systematic secondment of senior agentes to the post of princeps officii (the senior-ranking official heading an administrative department) in the praetorian and urban prefectures, all dioceses and a number of important provinces. Their position in these departments was ambiguous.
On the one hand, along with the other — internally promoted — senior officials, such as the cornicularius or primiscrinius, the princeps worked closely with his superior (prefect, vicarius or governor), bearing a considerable part of the responsibility for the administrative activity of his new department.
On the other hand, the princeps was also well placed to keep these men and their affairs under surveillance and to report back to the magister officiorum to whom, as a serving agens in rebus, he remained ultimately responsible.
Reflecting on the history of the eastern praetorian prefecture in the late fourth century, John Lydus (himself an ex-cornicularius) had no doubt of the reason for this system of cross-departmental promotion: it was a deliberate restriction on the activities of the prefecture by an emperor who feared the autonomy of a powerful department.
Similar tensions — and a repetitive insistence by emperors on the retention of some degree of independent action — were also played out in the selection, appointment and promotion of officials. As in any administrative organization, seniority was a significant factor. In 331, Constantine affirmed this principle for the advancement of exceptores in the eastern praetorian prefecture:
“Each shall succeed to a position according to his rank-order in the department and his merit, in so far as he would have deserved to obtain that position by length of service”
In addition to recognising the importance of promotion by seniority, imperial laws also entitled certain higher-ranking officials in the central administration to appoint on their retirement a son or brother to a junior post in the same department. Alongside seniority and inheritance, merit and competence might also be represented as relevant criteria for securing advancement.
In 393, Theodosius I, Arcadius and Honorius instructed the eastern praetorian prefect that promotions were to be made on the basis of proficiency:
“Enquiry shall be made to determine not who first entered the imperial service, but who has remained constant in the pursuit of his duty.”
In more extravagantly rhetorical terms, Constantius II praised the achievements and capabilities of Flavius Philippus, who in 351 had been stripped (perhaps mistakenly) of his praetorian prefecture after confusion over his relations with the usurper Magnentius [Germanic Western Roman emperor from 350 to 353]. An imperial letter to the proconsul of Asia - subsequently inscribed and publicly displayed in Ephesus — proclaimed:
“Innate virtue has this outstanding advantage for tested and faithful men, that when such a man is constantly alert in furthering the interests of his emperor and of the state, the glory of the endeavour compensates for the discomfort of the life itself, and besides, as regards fame, he is considered to have sought to obtain for himself this recognition: that by merit in the service of his employer he has succeeded as a result of hard work and long experience.”
Despite such fulsome imperial praise (for a safely dead official), the importance of proficiency or competence in ensuring selection should not be overstated.
In many laws, merita seem merely to be synonymous with length of service. Moreover, without entrance examinations or formal qualifications, any assessment of a candidate's ability was unavoidably dependent on personal recommendation.
Suffragium — the influence exercised by family or friends (and their well-placed connections) — was frequently a key factor in ensuring a successful career. Over a quarter of the nine hundred surviving letters of the fourth-century senator Quintus Aurelius Symmachus (urban prefect of Rome in 384) were directed to well-placed acquaintances, often themselves office-holders, who might be of help in finding posts for his proteges. Writing, perhaps somewhere in the 380s, to Virius Nicomachus Flavianus (in turn quaestor sacri palatii, praeto-rian prefect and consul), Symmachus — with accustomed well-turned elegance — put his request:
“Many people speak well of the merits of Sexio, who formerly governed Calabria. As a result of these, they have requested that I should recommend him to your patronage (suffragium). It is part of your customary good nature to regard as worthy of your affection those whom others have found agreeable. I ask you, then, that if nothing stands in the way of satisfying the wishes of those who make this request, you allow Sexio to profit from my words and the hopes of many.”
For those without access to grand patrons and their networks, recommendations for office (and often even the position itself) could sometimes be secured through the payment of money. In 362, the emperor Julian legislated to prevent litigation for the recovery of monies paid out in exchange for recommendations. In similar terms, in 394, Theodosius I affirmed that contracts to exchange gold, silver, movables and urban or rural property in return for a recommendation were enforceable in the courts.
As these legal provisions indicate, money transactions might be concluded openly and officially sanctioned. The acquisition of a post through purchased recommendation was no more clandestine or underhand than reliance on the support of friends or connections. Indeed, by the mid fourth century, suffragium was used, frequently without distinction, to refer to a candidate's influence — however obtained.
This blurred spectrum of possibilities for appointment and promotion significantly reduced the independence and security of officials. Neither ability, nor seniority, nor inherited right, nor influence, nor the payment of money (nor some combination of these) was a sure guarantee of advancement. In such a system, emperors were more easily able to emphasise the importance of their own position — and the degree to which a successful career depended upon imperial favour — by encouraging or frustrating various tactics.
A potentially threatening coalition might be weakened by the insistence on promotion by seniority or merit, rather than by the recommendation of senior officers or other influential persons. Candidates not on existing networks might be brought into a department through the purchase of office. Conversely, a favoured individual might be allowed to strengthen his position by recommending the appointment of friends, family or associates.
Taken together, imperial laws present a bewildering variety of tactics reflecting continual shifts in the criteria of appointment: the purchase of offices was not always sanctioned; seniority was not always preferred over merit. More often than not, there was no attempt at setting out clear-cut or unambiguous provisions. Rather, imperial legislation revealed a series of kaleidoscopic combinations — inheritance, the payment of money, merit and seniority all jostled , overlapped and competed against each other:
The Emperors Theodosius II and Valentinian III to Nomus magister officiorum
(26 February 444):
“It is clear that it is utterly forbidden for any one, when he is later in the time of his appointment, to seek to gain the position of one ahead of him, unless perhaps it might be the case that there is a person who, held back by the time of his appointment, is superior in regard to his work... We also decree that this rule be observed, except by the sons of the heads of departments. And indeed we determine that it is possible for each head to give preference to one of his sons, who, as regards length of service, shall have the advantage [suffragium] that even if he is known to have paid little attention to the imperial administration, he shall be protected from those who are appointed subsequently with the merit of experience … Notwithstanding this, we order a person who has been granted a position in a department, to pay, in addition, 250 gold coins to the [retiring] head of department … But if anyone … in order not to pay the money, wishes to decline the position, freedom is granted to substitute the next candidate in order of appointment upon payment of the aforementioned sum of money, in such a way that it is clear that if the second, or even the third, or anyone of whatever number, should persist with the same wish to be excused, the same opportunity, as was given to the one above who refused it, may also be given to the next in order of appointment.”
In such an intricate (and often uncertain) system there were undoubtedly costs in administrative efficiency. But efficiency is only one way of judging success. Many of the complexities and confusions which characterise later Roman bureaucracy reflect a careful balance — delicately engineered by both officials and emperors — between the maintenance of an administration which enabled a greater degree of control to be exercised over empire, and the preservation of some measure of imperial autonomy.
In 384, Quintus Aurelius Symmachus, then urban prefect of Rome, was required to adjudicate in a dispute over the appointment of one of the archiatri (state-funded doctors) in the city. In 370, Valentinian I had ruled that a new appointee should be selected by existing office-holders and be counted the most junior in order of precedence. But in 384, when a vacancy arose, one John — a highly placed former bureaucrat in the central administration — presenting a special imperial grant of title, petitioned for the post and the second most senior rank. The doctors appealed to Symmachus, arguing that John's grant contravened previous legislation on appointment. In such a situation — faced with apparently contradictory imperial pronouncements — Symmachus refused to adjudicate. He referred the whole issue to Valentinian II. He closed his covering letter to the emperor by deferentially explaining his failure to decide the matter:
“Therefore, disturbed by these uncertainties and neither venturing to quash the decree of your divine father nor to counter a particular imperial directive, I have left the final decision in this case to the divine judgement of your Godhead; I have appended the depositions of the parties involved and I await what your august counsels may decide.”
Symmachus' inability independently to resolve this difficulty was critical to the maintenance of imperial influence within later Roman bureaucracy. It drew attention to the central importance of emperors' decisions in determining rights or conferring legitimacy. By shifting responsibilities between departments or changing the criteria for appointment, emperors acted to prevent their exclusion from an administrative system more dependent for its successful day-to-day operation on predictable regulation than on the caprice of imperial will. For emperors, efficiency was not always an overriding consideration.
The clear advantages of a more systematically organised bureaucracy had to be weighed against an equally pressing need to retain an effective level of imperial control over high-ranking officials and their departmental subordinates. The inevitable waste of resources caused by duplication, cross-checking, the transfer of personnel and the arbitrary division of tasks had to be balanced against an ever-present threat of further imperial isolation in the face of a more unified or streamlined administration. Later Roman emperors had no intention of becoming mere rois faineants [French: ‘do-nothing kings’]. There were limits to the order they sought to impose and to the degree of predictability they found desirable in government. In an increasingly bureaucratic world, the continued presence of doubt and ambiguity helped ensure that emperors — rather than their officials — stood the greater chance of remaining the final arbiters upon whom all depended.
[Sections to follow: ‘Corruption’, ‘Conclusions’.]
Please send comments or corrections to me directly at mgs.heller@gmail.com
Tell your friends and colleagues about Social Science Files
Social Science Files displays multidisciplinary writings on a great variety of topics relating to evolutions of social order from the earliest humans to the present day and future machine age