Bernard Crick wrote:
CHAPTER I
THE NATURE OF POLITICAL RULE
Who has not often felt the distaste with democratic politics which Salazar expressed when he said that he “detested politics from the bottom of his heart; all those noisy and incoherent promises, the impossible demands, the hotchpotch of unfounded ideas and impractical plans . . . opportunism that cares neither for truth nor justice, the inglorious chase after unmerited fame, the unleashing of uncontrollable passions, the exploitation of the lowest instincts, the distortion off acts ... all that feverish and sterile fuss”?
From a leading article in The Times, 16 November, 1961
Boredom with established truths is a great enemy of free men. So there is some excuse in troubled times not to be clever and inventive in redefining things, or to pretend to academic unconcern or scientific detachment, but simply to try to make some old platitudes pregnant. This essay simply seeks to help in the task of restoring confidence in the virtues of politics as a great and civilising human activity. Politics, like Antreus in the Greek myth, can remain perpetually young, strong and lively so long as it can keep its feet firmly on the ground of Mother Earth. We live in a human condition, so we cannot through politics grasp for an absolute ideal, as Plato taught with bewitching single-mindedness. But the surface of the earth varies greatly, and being human we are restless and have many different ideals and are forced to anticipate the future as well as enjoy the fruits of the past, so equally politics cannot be a ‘purely practical and immediate’ activity, as those who cannot see beyond the end of their own noses praise themselves by claiming.
Politics is too often regarded as a poor relation, inherently dependent and subsidiary; it is rarely praised as something with a life and character of its own. Politics is not religion, ethics, law, science, history or economics; it neither solves everything, nor is it present everywhere; and it is not any one political doctrine, such as conservatism, liberalism, socialism, communism or nationalism, though it can contain elements of most of these things. Politics is politics, to be valued as itself, not because it is 'like' or 'really is' something else more respectable or peculiar. Politics is politics.
The person who wishes not to be troubled by politics and to be left alone finds himself the unwitting ally of those to whom politics is a troublesome obstacle to their well meant intentions to leave nothing alone.
To some this may seem very obvious. But then there will be no harm in reminding them how few they are. All over the world there are men aspiring to power and there are actual rulers who, however many different names they go by, have in common a rejection of politics. … Fidel Castro tells a reporter: ‘We are not politicians. We made our revolution to get the politicians out. We are social people. This is a social revolution’. In so many places the cry has gone up that the party or the leader is defending the people against the politicians. … Many people, of course, even in regimes which are clearly political, think that they are not interested in politics, and even act as if they are not; but they are probably few compared to the many who think that politics is muddled, contradictory, self-defeatingly recurrent, un-progressive, un-patriotic, inefficient, mere compromise, or even a sham or conspiracy by which political parties seek to preserve some particular and peculiar social systems against the challenge of the inevitable future, etc. The anti-political are very right to think that politics is an achievement far more limited in time and place than politically-minded men, or men who practise this odd thing politics, normally presume.
… Publicists would perhaps do better simply to defend the activity of politics itself. For it is a very much more precise thing than is commonly supposed; it is essential to genuine freedom; it is unknown in any but advanced and complex societies; and it has specific origins only found in European experience. It is something to be valued almost as a pearl beyond price in the history of the human condition, though, in fact, to overvalue it can be to destroy it utterly.
Perhaps there is something to be said for writing in praise of an activity which seems so general that few people can feel any great passion to appropriate it, or to nationalise it, as the exclusive property of any one group of men or of any particular programme of government.
It is Aristotle who first states what should be recognised as the fundamental, elementary proposition of any possible political science. He is, as it were, the anthropologist who first characterises and distinguishes what still appears to be a unique invention or discovery of the Greek world. … Politics arises … according to great Aristotle, in organised states which recognise themselves to be an aggregate of many members, not a single tribe, religion, interest or tradition. Politics arises from accepting the fact of the simultaneous existence of different groups, hence different interests and different traditions, within a territorial unit under a common rule. It does not matter much how that unit came to be—by custom, conquest or geographical circumstance. What does matter is that its social structure, unlike some primitive societies, is sufficiently complex and divided to make politics a plausible response to the problem of governing it, the problem of maintaining order at all. But the establishing of political order is not just any order at all; it marks the birth, or the recognition, of freedom. For politics represents at least some tolerance of differing truths, some recognition that government is possible, indeed best conducted, amid the open canvassing of rival interests. Politics are the public actions of free men. Freedom is the privacy of men from public actions.
Common usage of the word might encourage one to think that politics is a real force in every organised state. But a moment's reflection should reveal that this common usage can be highly misleading. For politics, as Aristotle points out, is only one possible solution to the problem of order. It is by no means the most usual. Tyranny is the most obvious alternative—the rule of one strong man in his own interest; and oligarchy is the next most obvious alternative—the rule of one group in their own interest. The method of rule of the tyrant and the oligarch is quite simply to clobber, coerce or overawe all or most of these other groups in the interest of their own. The political method of rule is to listen to these other groups so as to conciliate them as far as possible, and to give them a legal position, a sense of security, some clear and reasonably safe means of articulation, by which these other groups can and will speak freely. Ideally politics draws all these groups into each other so that they each and together can make a positive contribution towards the general business of government, the maintaining of order. The different ways in which this can be done are obviously many, even in any one particular circumstance of competing social interests; and in view of the many different states and changes of circumstance there have been, are and will be, possible variations on the theme of political rule appear to be infinite. But, however imperfectly this process of deliberate conciliation works, it is nevertheless radically different from tyranny, oligarchy, kingship, dictatorship, despotism and what is probably the only distinctively modern type of rule totalitarianism.
Certainly it may sometimes seem odd, in light of common usage, to say that there is no politics in totalitarian or tyrannical regimes. But usage does not destroy real distinctions. And this distinction has often been drawn. When Chief Justice Fortescue in the mid-fifteenth century said that England was both regimen politicum et regale, he meant that while the King could declare law only by the consultation and consent of Parliament, yet he was absolute in power to enforce the law and to defend the realm. But a regime purely regale or royal would not be a political regime at all.
In trying to understand the many forms of government that there are, of which political rule is only one, it is particularly easy to mistake rhetoric for theory. To say that all governing involves politics is either rhetoric or muddle. Why call, for instance, a struggle for power 'politics' when it is simply a struggle for power? Two or more factions within a single party, or the clients of two great men, struggle for a monopoly of power: there may be no political or constitutional procedures whatever to contain this struggle, or powerful enough to do so, and the contestants will regard any compromise as a pure tactic or breathing-space on the way to the complete victory of one faction and the suppression of the other. Certainly there is a sense in which, even in a tyranny or totalitarian regime, politics exists up to the moment when the ruler finds himself free to act alone. While he is not free to act alone, while he is forced to consult other people whom he regards as his enemies, either through necessity or through a temporary ignorance of their real power, he is in some kind of a political relationship. But it is essentially fragile and unwanted. The ruler will not, nor may anyone else, regard it as normal, even if it could be shown that it is perennial. Politics is then regarded simply as an obstacle—and, in a sense, it is an obstacle, but it may not be an at all secure or effective one. Some politics may exist in un-free regimes, but it is unwanted—a measure to their rulers of inadequate progress towards unity.
There is no need, then, to deny that elements of politics can exist in tyrannical and other regimes-rather the contrary. Sophocles makes this point in the Antigone:
CREON — Then she is not breaking the law?
HAEMON —Your fellow-citizens would deny it, to a man.
CREON — And the polis proposes to teach me how to rule?
HAEMON — Ah. Who is it that's talking like a boy now?
CREON — Can any voice but mine give orders in this polis?
HAEMON — It is no polis if it takes orders from one voice.
CREON — But custom gives possession to the ruler.
HAEMON — You’d rule a desert beautifully alone.
Suppose I had made my point less strongly by rendering polis as simply 'city'; we would still see a word being contested for by two different theories of government. The great hope for politics is that it is, in the long run, a more workable way of maintaining order than the one Creon chose or stuck to. Politics thus arises from a recognition of restraints. The character of this recognition may be moral, but more often it is simply prudential, a recognition of the power of social groups and interests, a pro duct of being unable, without more violence and risk than one can stomach, to rule alone. (An anti-political moral heroine like Antigone may arouse the city, but it is the power of the city that counts. Creon is a bad man to refuse to let her bury her rebel brother, but he is a bad ruler because he does not allow for the power of the city on this issue.) It is, of course, often possible to rule alone. But it is always highly difficult and highly dangerous. ‘To make a desert and to call it peace’ is not impossible, nor is it uncommon. But fortunately most ordinary politicians realise the incalculability of violence, and do not always need to wreck the State in learning this lesson.
[THE DEFINITION]
Politics, then, can be simply defined as the activity by which differing interests within a given unit of rule are conciliated by giving them a share in power in proportion to their importance to the welfare and the survival of the whole community. And, to complete the formal definition, a political system is that type of government where politics proves successful in ensuring reasonable stability and order.
Aristotle attempted to argue that these compromises must in some sense be creative of future benefits—that each exists for a further purpose. But it is probably wiser to keep what we want to defend as simple as possible and simply to point out that no finality is implied in any act of conciliation or compromise. Each compromise has at least served some purpose, teleological or not, if at the time it is made it enables orderly government to be carried on at all. Orderly government is, after all, a civilised value compared to anarchy or arbitrary rule; and political government, other things being equal, clearly remains more acceptable to more people if they are ever given any chance or choice in the matter. Advocates of particular political doctrines—as will be seen—should beware of denying the context in which their doctrines can operate politically: their claims can never be exclusive. The political process is not tied to any particular doctrine. Genuine political doctrines, rather, are the attempt to find particular and workable solutions to this perpetual and shifty problem of conciliation.
Why cannot a good ruler do this, without all the muddle and uncertainty of politics? — it will always be asked. When the academic is asked this question by an ordinary person in urgency or innocence, he coughs and blushes, feels that he is· meant to utter a platitude and tries to remember correctly Lord Acton's words about all power corrupting. Aristotle, however, took this as a perfectly serious issue of principle. If there was a ‘perfectly just man’ he should, by right and reason, be made king (just as we should obey any party which could prove that it knows which way the iron laws of history are unfolding for our future benefit). This for some is at least a theoretical possibility—and an interesting one. There is no similar hope for an absolute justification of political rule. The answer is a practical one; Aristotle thinks, not surprisingly, that such a man is not very likely to be found. We have no particular need to take his word for that when faced with our own modern gallery of moralistic autocrats, dictators promising the moon and various ‘fathers of their people’. Many of these men are not, in any ordinary sense, bad men; but few, to put it mildly, could be described as ‘perfectly good’. And to Aristotle the slightest flaw will disqualify one, will put one in need of some restraint. It was only the perfectly good man who would not need to listen to his fellows, who would not need to have rival powers so firmly entrenched that he has to listen. Indeed, he remarks that the man who can live outside the polis is either a beast or a god. God is the only possible being who does not need to consult, having no fellows; God is the only possible being whose command is identical with law and justice. … The utility of such a notion for rulers is less surprising than the willingness of many followers, even in our own times, to treat their leaders as if they were God: the declarer of the law, the one above criticism, above the need to consult, the only truly self-sufficient man.
Politics, then, to Aristotle, was something natural, not of divine origin, simply the ‘master science’ among men. Politics was the master-science not in the sense that it includes or explains all other 'sciences' (all skills, social activities and group interests), but in that it gives them some priority, some order in their rival claims on the always scarce resources of any given community. The way of establishing these priorities is by allowing the right institutions to develop by which the various ‘sciences' can demonstrate their actual importance in the common task of survival. Politics are, as it were, the market place and the price mechanism of all social demands.
Now it is often thought that for this ‘master-science’ to function, there must be already in existence some shared idea of a ‘common good’, some ‘consensus’ or consensus juris. But this common good is itself the process of practical reconciliation of the interests of the various 'sciences', aggregates or groups which compose a state…
But diverse groups hold together, firstly, because they have a common interest in sheer survival and, secondly, because they practise politics—not because they agree about ‘fundamentals’, or some such concept too vague, too personal, or too divine ever to do the job of politics for it. The moral consensus of a free state is not something mysteriously prior to or above politics: it is the activity (the civilising activity) of politics itself.
Now, of course, our aspirations and actions will be sadly disembodied spirits if they cannot go beyond a mere appreciation of what politics is all about. We shall all want to do something with it. Those who sit tight and drift, murmuring incantations which did not wreck us yesterday, are apt to be cast away on hostile shores. Those who urge us to remember that our only clearly demonstrable task is simply to keep the ship afloat have a rather curious view of the purpose of ships. Even if there is no single predetermined port of destination, clearly all directions are still not equally preferable. ‘What politics is’ does not destroy or exhaust the question ‘What do we want to get out of it?’ But we may not go about trying to get what we want in a political manner at all.
For politics is to be seen neither as a set of fixed principles to be realised in the near future, nor yet as a set of traditional habits to be preserved, but as an activity, a sociological activity which has the anthropological function of preserving a community grown too complicated for either tradition alone or pure arbitrary rule to preserve it without the undue use of coercion. Burke's aphorism about the need to reform in order to preserve is a characterisation of the political method of rule far more profound than that of those conservatives who hold that politics is simply a communication received from tradition.
Politics is, then, an activity—and this platitude must be brought to life: it is not the grasping for the ideal, but it is not pure self-interest either, simply because the more realistically one construes self-interest the more one is involved in relation ships with others, and because, after all, some men in most part, most men in some part, have certain standards of conduct which do not always fit circumstances too exactly. The more one is involved in relationships with others, the more conflicts of interest, or of character and circumstance, will arise. These conflicts, when personal, create the activity we call ‘ethics’ (or else that type of action, as arbitrary as it is irresponsible, called 'selfish'); and such conflicts, when public, create political activity (or else some type of rule in the selfish interest of a single group).
Consider another human activity, almost as famous as politics-something which is again, neither an implementation of principles nor a matter of pure expediency: sexuality. … Both are activities in which the human group maintains itself amid the utmost variations in, for the actors involved, success and failure, tragedy and joy, passion and prudence, and in those dialectic syntheses more often domestic and familiar. Politics, then, like sexuality is an activity which must be carried on; one does not create it or decide to join in—one simply becomes more and more aware that one is involved in it as part of the human condition. One can only forsake, renounce or do without it by doing oneself (which can easily be done-and on the highest principles) unnatural injury. To renounce or destroy politics is to destroy the very thing which gives order to the pluralism and variety of civilised society …
… And equally the word ‘government’ must be taken seriously and recognised for what it is: the organisation of a group of men in a given community for survival. Thomas Hobbes, after all, spent a great deal of time arguing the massively simple point that if one does not survive, there is no knowing whether one has made the right choice. But there are good grounds for thinking that politics is often a more effective way of ensuring survival than the absolute rule of Leviathan. Whether Leviathan is a monarch, a dictator, a party or a 'nation in arms', he is apt to be a pretty clumsy fellow who has few reliable ways of knowing what is really going on (representative electoral institutions, for instance, seem a fairly good way by which a govern ment can find out what people will do and what they will stand for). But this ignorance on the part of autocracy only arises because one part of survival is a continuous process of adaptation to complicated social changes, economic and technological; this need to consult cannot eliminate the other type of survival which is military, or at least militant, the capacity to act without compromise or normal consultation in a state of emergency, whether flood, famine, pestilence or war itself. Leviathan must be there already—he cannot be created in a hurry, but he is the guarantor of politics, neither the single leader nor the negation. His authority, like that of the two Dictators of Republican Rome, ceases with the ends of the emergency. Quis custodiet custodes? Who, indeed, shall guard the guardians? There is, perhaps it should be simply said, no possible general answer to this question. History is rich with experiment and examples, some relatively successful, some complete failures. Only the problem is clear enough. As Lincoln put it amid the agony of Civil War: “It has long been a grave question whether any government not too strong for the liberties of its people, can be strong enough to maintain its liberties in great emergencies”.
The guardians may, indeed, try to carry on ruling the country after the end of the emergency or, more often, by prolonging the emergency-if they can get away with it. There is no possible 'right' of revolution to check this. As John Locke tried to argue: revolution is the destruction of a particular order of rights. But, thinking in sociological rather than legal terms, Locke had an obvious point; there may come a time when people are driven to rebel by the failure of a government to govern politically at all. The state of emergency is the time of sovereignty—when all power has to go to and to come from one source, if the community is to survive at all. But in normal times in some fortunate states the 'sovereignty' of governments is a very formal thing compared to the reality of politics. Hobbes' Leviathan saw government as a perpetual state of emergency. Hobbes may have been frightened in the womb by the guns of the Spanish Armada, and he may have thought sixty years later that there was nothing more terrible than Englishmen killing Englishmen in civil war, but that is no excuse for not studying, as Machiavelli did, the problem of how to maintain a state through time (which is a problem of spreading power), as well as how to preserve it in crisis (which is a problem of concentrating power). …
… [Politics] can exist only where it has been preceded by sovereignty or where sovereignty can be quickly called into being. So if politics, to be· a stable and possible method of rule, requires some settled order, as well as tolerance and diversity, then the relationships between states themselves can be seen at their best only as a kind of quasi-politics. The will to conciliate and compromise may actually be stronger at times in international relations, simply because it is more difficult to calculate whether one is powerful enough to ignore diplomacy, than it is to know whether one can govern unpolitically in a single, settled country. But the possibility of politicising an established order is largely absent simply because there is no established order—only a speculative and doubtful common interest in peace, or some more certain, but more abstract, moral fact of human brotherhood. The agony of international relations is the need to try to practise politics without the basic conditions for political order. The cold war would not have surprised Hobbes, for he defined 'War' simply as 'time men live without common power to keep them all in awe'. …
Similarly, common usage may encourage us to talk about politics in the small group … [But] if all discussion, conflict, rivalry, struggle and even conciliation is called politics, then it is forgotten, once more, that politics depends on some settled order. Small groups are subordinate parts of that order. They may help to create politics, but their internal behaviour is not political simply because their individual function is quite different from that of the state itself.
If the argument is, then, that politics is simply the activity by which government is made possible when differing interests in an area to be governed grow powerful enough to need to b conciliated, the obvious objection will be: 'why do certain interests have to be conciliated?' And the answer is, of course, that they do not have to be. Other paths are always open. Politics is simply when they are conciliated—that solution to the problem of order which chooses conciliation rather than violence and coercion, and chooses it as an effective way by which varying interests can discover that level of compromise best suited to their common interest in survival. Politics allows various types of power within a community to find some reason able level of mutual tolerance and support. Coercion (or secession or migration) need arise only when one group or interest feels that it has no common interest in survival with the rest. …
… Political freedom is a response to a need of government—it is not, as so many sentimentally think, an external impetus that somehow forces, or persuades, governments to act tolerantly. The freedom of a group will be established at the moment when its power or its existence cannot be denied and must be reckoned with in governing a country as it actually is. …
… ’Politics’, then, simply summarises an activity whose history is a mixture of accident and deliberate achievement, and whose social basis is to be found only in quite complicated societies. …
A political doctrine I take to be simply a coherently related set of proposals for the conciliation of actual social demands in relation to a scarcity of resources. …
A political doctrine is … just an attempt to strike a particular harmony in an actual political situation, one harmony out of many possible different (temporary) resolutions of the basic problem of unity and diversity in a society with complex and entrenched rival social interests. This problem is the germ of politics and freedom.
Some freedom, at least, must exist wherever there is political rule. For politics is a process of discussion, and discussion demands, in the original Greek sense, dialectic. For discussion to be genuine and fruitful when something is maintained, the opposite or some contrary case must be considered or-better maintained by someone who believes it. The hallmark of free government everywhere, it is an old but clear enough test, is whether public criticism is allowed in a manner conceivably effective—in other words, whether opposition is tolerated. Politics needs men who will act freely, but men cannot act freely without politics. Politics is a way of ruling divided societies without undue violence-and most societies are divided, though some think that that is the very trouble. We can do much worse than honour ‘mere politics’ so we must examine very carefully the claims of those who would do better. …
The Source:
Bernard Crick, In Defence of Politics, University of Chicago Press 1962
[MGH: I used the 1st Edition. Later editions were a bit different, but not much. Below is part of a note by Bernard Crick for the 6th edition, and part of a Guardian review.]
“In the first edition I spoke enigmatically of having ‘bitten two of the hands that had fed me’ at the LSE. I meant Harold Laski, socialist, and Michael Oakeshott, conservative. I did learn much from both. By the second edition I was aware how much in debt I had been to the late Carl Joachim Friedrich at Harvard and to the writings of Hannah Arendt. Ernest Gellner gave me stern and helpful criticism of my first draft …” Bernard Crick, Edinburgh 4 July 2000.
“One of the most thoughtful products of the political dialogues of the London School of Economics since the great days of Tawney, Dalton, Wallas and Hobhouse. Its sobriety, liberal spirit and toughness of mind are rare qualities in any political work.”Edward Shils, The Guardian
Evolutions of social order from the earliest humans to the present day and future machine age.