#10 Schumpeter and Aristotle on Teleology
Teleology, or the attempt to explain institutions and forms of behavior causally by the social need or purpose they are supposed to serve, is obviously not always erroneous: many things in society can be, of course, not only understood in terms of their purpose but also causally explained by it. In all sciences that deal with purposive human actions, teleology must always play some role. But it must be handled with care; and there is the ever-present danger of making improper use of it. Mostly, this improper use consists in exaggerating the extent to which men act, and shape the institutions under which they live, according to clearly perceived ends that they consciously wish to realize in the most rational way. This is why the teleological error may be called a particular instance of the wider category of rationalist errors. It is interesting to note, however, that Aristotle was quite free from the teleological error in matters outside of his social science. In Physicae auscultationes (II, 8) he recognized, for instance, that our teeth are adapted to chewing food, not because they were made for this purpose but, as he thought, because individuals who are by accident endowed with serviceable teeth have a better chance of surviving than those who have not. What a curious piece of Darwinism!
Joseph Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis, edited from manuscript by Elizabeth Boody Schumpeter, with an Introduction by Mark Perlman, first published in Great Britain in 1954 by Allen & Unwin (Publishers) Ltd., this edition published by Routledge, 2006.
Book 1, Chapter 1
Every skill and every inquiry, and similarly every action and rational choice, is thought to aim at some good; and so the good has been aptly described as that at which everything aims. But it is clear that there is some difference between ends: some ends are activities, while others are products which are additional to the activities. In cases where there are ends additional to the actions, the products are by their nature better than the activities. Since there are many actions, skills, and sciences, it happens that there are many ends as well: the end of medicine is health, that of shipbuilding, a ship, that of military science, victory, and that of domestic economy, wealth. But when any of these actions, skills, or sciences comes under some single faculty — as bridlemaking and other sciences concerned with equine equipment come under the science of horsemanship, and horsemanship itself and every action in warfare come under military science, and others similarly come under others — then in all these cases the end of the master science is more worthy of choice than the ends of the subordinate sciences, since these latter ends are pursued also for the sake of the former. And it makes no difference whether the ends of the actions are the activities themselves, or something else additional to them, as in the sciences just mentioned.
Book 1, Chapter 2
So if what is done has some end that we want for its own sake, and everything else we want is for the sake of this end; and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else (because this would lead to an infinite progression, making our desire fruitless and vain), then clearly this will be the good, indeed the chief good. Surely, then, knowledge of the good must be very important for our lives? And if, like archers, we have a target, are we not more likely to hit the right mark? If so, we must try at least roughly to comprehend what it is and which science or faculty is concerned with it. Knowledge of the good would seem to be the concern of the most authoritative science, the highest master science.
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, translated and edited by Roger Crisp, St Anne's College, Oxford, Cambridge 2004.
END (telos): The goal or target of a thing, the attainment of which fulfills its nature. Hence the English term "teleological:' It is related to the adjective teleios, translated as "complete" or "perfect," i.e., that which shares in the qualities of the end.
Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, translated, with an interpretive essay, notes, and glossary by Robert C. Bartlett and Susan D. Collins, Chicago 2011